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ABSTRACT 
 
Using panel data on professional footballers and their teams over a seven year period we 
find a substantial wage premium for migrants which persists within teams and is only 
partially accounted for by players' on-field labour productivity.  We show that the 
differential partly reflects the superstar status of migrant workers. This superstar effect is 
apparent in migrant effects on team performance and crowd attendance.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is an established literature identifying a migrant wage premium in professional 
football and another literature examining the role of superstars in professional football. 
Although professional football is a truly global labour market with superstar performers 
(Lucifora and Simmons, 2003) ours is one of only two papers (the other being Kleven et 
al., 2013) that links migration and superstardom. We show that increases in the migrant 
share of football players at a club increases team wins and crowd attendance, as one 
might expect if migrants were superstars. 
 
Our empirical setting is professional football in Italy. We have panel data for all players 
in Italian football's Serie A (and for many in Serie B) for a seven year period through to 
2008 which contains very rich data on individual players including their nationality and 
their labour productivity for each game which we aggregate to the season-level, together 
with players' annual salaries.  The player data are linked to the football teams for which 
they play, allowing us to condition on team fixed effects and explore time-varying team 
fortunes. We estimate players' contributions to team wins and fan attendance at games 
which, in our data, are the key determinant of team revenues.  We argue that the increase 
in team points and crowd attendance with the rise in the percentage of migrants in the 
team is a strong indicator of their superstar status. 
 
We find a substantial wage penalty for domestic (Italian) players relative to their migrant 
counterparts. It persists within firms and is only partially accounted for by individual 
labour productivity.  We show that the differential partly reflects the superstar status of 
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migrant workers. It also reflects domestic workers' preferences for working in their home 
region, an amenity for which they are prepared to take a compensating wage differential, 
or else are forced to accept in the face of employer monopsony power which does not 
affect migrant workers. 
 
We argue that the Italian league is not exceptional, so our results are likely to hold in 
other major European football leagues. However, we cannot say whether our results can 
be extrapolated beyond football to other settings. 
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section Two reviews the previous 
literature on the labour market for professional footballers  including the only other paper 
we are aware of that looks at the wage effects of migration.  Section Three outlines our 
theoretical framework. Section Four presents our data and the institutional setting for the 
empirical analysis. Section Five outlines our empirical strategy. Section Six presents 
results and Section Seven concludes. 
 
2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
There is broad acceptance in the literature of Rosen's (1981: 845) definition of 
superstardom as a situation in which a "relatively small numbers of people earn enormous 
amounts of money and dominate the activities in which they engage". However, there 
exist two distinct theories about superstar formation and thus links between superstars 
and wages. The first is Rosen's (1981) which emphasises the role of talent: superstars 
arise where there is a convex relationship between the distribution of talent and the 
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distribution of rewards such that "small differences in talent become magnified in large 
earnings differences" (Rosen, 1981: 846).  Adler (1985), on the other hand, building on 
Stigler and Becker's (1977) theory of consumption capital, argues that superstardom is 
popularity and, as such, can arise in the absence of superior talent.  He maintains that 
"stardom is a market device to economise on learning costs in activities where the more 
you know the more you enjoy. Thus stardom may be independent of the existence of a 
hierarchy of talent" (1981: 208-209).   
 
However, neither talent nor popularity alone are sufficient to generate superstar salaries. 
Both Rosen and Adler believe superstardom arises in businesses where there are highly 
skewed positive returns to talent associated with scale economies of joint consumption 
which allow relatively few sellers to service a large market. This is what Rosen (1981: 
846) refers to as "one's personal market scale".2  Superstar salaries may be offered in 
professional football, a business which can leverage consumer preferences for superstar 
talent using media and marketing strategies which allow them to reach a very large 
market (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003).  We might anticipate the large premium attached 
to top talent to diminish having conditioned on labour productivity but wages will also 
reflect competition for the scarce talent which can generate firm revenues via off-field 
activities such as merchandise selling.   
 
                                                 
2 Not all industries are conducive to these superstar effects. Ehrmann et al (2009) investigate the possibility 
of Adler and Rosen superstar effects among celebrity chefs in Germany, defined as those with media 
appearances. They find that superstar effects on restaurant revenues  are quantitatively rather small from 
either source.  
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Franck and Nüesch (2012) present evidence linking footballers' wages in Germany to 
their popularity and talent. They show that both player performance and player popularity 
(proxied by non-performance related press citations) are determinants of superstar market 
values, defined as players in the top 5% of the distribution of market values. But they do 
not discuss the issue of migration. Different measures of superstardom have been used in 
the literature including Google hits (Garcia del Barrio and Pujol, 2007) and deviations 
from mean performance of other players (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003).  We adopt a 
theory-driven approach which focuses on the impact of the share of migrants on team 
performance and attendance.  If an increase in the share of migrants in a team is 
associated with its performance, this is consistent with migrants being superstars in the 
way Rosen proposed. If an increase in the share of migrants in a team increases crowd 
attendance this is consistent with migrants being superstars as conceived by Adler. 
  
A number of papers on the footballers’ labour market suggest the presence of salary 
premia by nationality. Frick’s (2007) survey of the player labour market notes salary 
premia for Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans over German nationals in three 
papers (Frick, 2006, Lehmann and Weigand, 1999, Feess et al. 2004; see also Frick, 
2011). Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2007) find that non-Spanish Europeans obtain a 
wage premium over Spanish-born players in the Spanish top division. We present 
evidence below that salary premia by nationality exist in Italian football as well, adding 
to evidence that migrant premia may be common in European football. We go further 
than the current literature by proposing that a combination of costs of migration (both 
monetary and psychic) and positive selection from the talent distribution helps generate 
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superstardom through player movement. We also identify a migrant wage premium for 
footballers in the presence of detailed measures of time varying labour productivity. The 
previous literature had labour productivity measures limited to goals and assists which 
are weighted towards forwards and do not properly account for performances of 
defenders and midfield players.3     
 
The only paper we are aware of that tackles migration and superstardom together is 
Kleven et al (2013). They show that top rate taxation affects the location of superstar 
professional footballers in Europe. Nevertheless, many continue to play in their home 
country. In a competitive market for talented workers, those choosing not to move may 
suffer a wage penalty because their preference to remain gives the employer some 
monopsony power in wage setting: there are few credible outside options if the 
preference for staying is strong. Also, a worker may be prepared to earn less by way of a 
compensating differential for the amenity derived from remaining local.   
 
Some literature examines the impacts of superstars on audiences through gate attendance 
(Berri and Schmidt, 2006; Brandes et al. 2008), television audience ratings (Hausman and 
Leonard, 1997; Feddersen and Rott, 2011) and team revenues (Franck and Nüesch, 
2012). We follow this approach by modelling the effects of superstars on team 
attendances. Estimation of a team attendance model facilitates a test of the Adler 
popularity hypothesis. 
 
                                                 
3 Franck and Nüesch (2012) use a large set of performance measures (20 in all) as control variables in their 
estimates of superstar effects on market values in the Bundesliga. However, they do not estimate nationality 
premia. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
From the standard theory of a worker’s migration decision (Borjas, 2006), there are two  
necessary and sufficient conditions for immigrants to be positively selected from the 
home country distribution and also for these immigrants to be above the mean of the 
home country distribution. The first condition states that the worker has higher returns to 
skill in the foreign country than the home country. Given that revenues are higher in Italy 
compared to most leagues in sending countries this would seem to be a reasonable 
proposition, excepting the elite leagues such as Spain and England. The second condition 
is that the correlation between skills valued in the home and foreign country should be 
sufficiently high. Since footballers’ skills are highly transferable this is again a reasonable 
condition to hold in our context. Hence, the best and most talented footballers leave their 
home countries where returns to their skills are sufficiently high to compensate for the 
costs of migration. Already there is evidence of such a migrant premium for professional 
footballers in  Germany and Spain.   
 
In professional football, players bargain with potential employers (clubs) through their 
agents. Since there are relatively few top tier clubs and relatively few vacancies for player 
positions in team squads (there are just 5 top level leagues in Europe each with 18 to 20 
clubs and there are roughly 25 first-team roster places for each club) the demand for 
specialist footballers capable of playing at the top level is small compared to regular 
occupations. Since the players’ labour market is thin, it is reasonable to expect that player 
wages are determined through bilateral bargaining (McLaughlin, 1994; Leeds and 
Kowaleski, 2001; Solow and Krautmann, 2011). 
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In basic bargaining theory, where a player and team maximise a joint surplus of payoffs, 
an increase in outside options raises the bargained wage. In our context, a greater 
valuation of domestic football and off-field culture by the player will lead to an increase 
in the value of the outside option and will feed through the Nash bargaining solution into 
a higher wage.4 An increase in switching costs will have a similar result. From these two 
points we conjecture that, for given ability, non-Italian European Union players will 
receive higher wages than Italians and migrant non-EU players since they have lower 
switching costs and higher outside options including a greater valuation of domestic 
location. Moreover, we observe migration where players with high ability are able to 
achieve their marginal revenue product, something that may only be accomplished by 
leaving their domestic setting for a larger-market league. Note also that domestic Italian 
players who choose not to move because of locational preferences are in effect conferring 
some monopsony power on Italian clubs and hence raising the bargaining power of these 
clubs. 
 
4. DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The institutional setting is Italian professional football. This is organised into two 
divisions. Currently, there are 20 teams in Serie A, the top division, and 22 teams in Serie 
B. Prior to the 2004-05 season there were 18 teams in Serie A and 22 teams in Serie B. 
Each season three teams are relegated from Serie A and replaced by another three 
                                                 
4 An earlier discussion paper version of this paper  (Bryson et al, 2012) offers formal models of player 
(worker) migration and of salary bargaining that integrates the migration decision into the bargaining 
solution.   
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promoted teams from Serie B. Clubs hire players and there is no limit to squad size, 
which typically varies from 25 to 40 players, excluding youth players. Player contracts 
are typically of two to five years in duration with various contingency clauses and options 
to renew (or leave). Players holding passports of a European Union country are free to 
move into and out of Italian clubs following the Bosman ruling of 1995 imposed by the 
European Court of Justice. The number of non-EU players that can be hired by a given 
club is subject to immigration controls which in Italy have varied considerably.5 In our 
data set, the percentage of Italian born players varies between 2000 and 2008 between 
69% and 74%, which is somewhat higher than native shares in other European football 
leagues, especially England and Germany (Frick, 2007). This may reflect Italians' 
preference to remain resident in Italy and the financial problems faced by Italian football 
in the early 2000s which may have limited the ability of Italian clubs to attract the best 
players from abroad (see below).  However, the most famous and most successful clubs 
are much more reliant on migrants than other clubs.  Over our sample period, the team 
with the most migrant players was Inter Milan: only 30% of their players were Italian 
while 56% came from outside the EU.   
 
Baroncelli and Lago (2006) note the growth in the size of the market for football in Italy 
in the period of the 1990s through to the beginning of our data.  The growth in potential 
revenues and the value of superstars in capturing market share meant very substantial 
wage growth at the top of the market for professional footballers in Italy.  However, in 
                                                 
5 Although the quotas varied over the period of our study, the percentage of non-European migrants in our 
sample has remained constant over time at between 21% and 23%. Furthermore, it seems clubs are able to 
borrow from other clubs' quotas such that the quotas are not binding on big clubs 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serie_A#Non-EU_players). 
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our sample period, the market went into reverse, with reduced club and league revenues 
(Boeri and Severgnini, 2012). The correlation between club revenues from sales of 
broadcast rights and club payrolls is almost unity (Buraimo et al, 2006). It is clear that in 
Italian football the reduction in league broadcast revenues in our sample period created 
downward pressure on team payrolls and player salaries. 
 
Italian footballers have a strong preference for remaining in Italy as opposed to living 
abroad to play football.  This amenity which many other Italian workers appear to prize 
(Boeri and van Ours, 2008; Manacorda and Moretti, 2006) gives some bargaining power 
to football club who, aware of the limitations on players' outside options, may set lower 
wages than might be the case for "like" migrant players who are more likely to exercise 
their outside options if they do not receive satisfactory wage offers in Italy.6  Thus, it is 
plausible that part of any wage penalty suffered by domestic workers is due to their desire 
to remain close to their place of birth.  We construct a dummy variable identifying 
Italians playing for a football club within 200km of their birth place. Nineteen percent of 
Italians in our sample were "local" on this criterion (11 percent of the sample). Having 
dropped players with missing data our estimation sample consists of 906 players playing 
for 34 clubs, that is, 2,488 player-year observations in Italy's Serie A and Serie B over the 
seven seasons from 2000 to 2007.  
 
                                                 
6 Some players might be willing to accept payment below their outside option in order to express their 
domestic preferences for remaining close to their families. 
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We have three dependent variables: players' wages, attendance at football matches and 
team points.7 The wage variable we use is basic salary before tax and also before bonuses 
and excluding image rights and endorsement deals.8  These are actual gross salaries as 
reported in Italian newspapers and annuals: Corriere dello Sport Stadio (2001), Il 
Messaggero (2002), La Pagelle di Paolo Ziliani (2004-05), Gazzetta dello Sport (2007).9  
Our salary data are collected in September in each year, hence at the start of any given 
season, while performance data refer to previous season values. Italy is the only country 
to make actual player salaries publicly available. For Germany and Spain, researchers 
have to rely on salary proxies, typically ‘market values’ published online 
(www.transfermarkt.de) or in magazines such as Kicker in Germany. To the extent that 
these proxies are well correlated with actual salaries, as argued by Frick (2011), we 
suggest that our results should generalise to Germany and Spain. 
 
5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our most general wage model is: 
(1) Log real salary  = f(age, age squared, experience,  player productivity, team fixed 
 effects, season dummies, nationality dummies) 
Player productivity is a vector of performance measures all assessed by season unless 
stated otherwise, specifically: career goals in Serie A, career goals in Serie B,  
                                                 
7 For a subset of clubs we also have gate revenues from match-day ticket sales and season tickets, although 
not other sources of revenue.  We do not use revenue in our analysis but it is highly correlated with 
attendance (correlation coefficient is 0.96). 
8 The role of player bonuses in offering incentives for team performance is explored in the setting of 
national teams competing in the FIFA World Cup by Coupe (2006). In football, and in team sports more 
generally, performance bonuses tend to be awarded at team rather than individual level, to avoid perverse 
responses to incentives. Torgler (2004) offers further analysis of the World Cup.  
9 Salary data were interpolated for 2003 and 2006. However, results presented are robust to the exclusion of 
these two years. 
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appearances in Serie A, appearances in Serie B, minutes played and minutes squared, lost 
balls, recovered balls, season goals in Serie A, goalkeeper saves, goal assists, shots on 
target , successful passes, tackles, fast breaks,  footballer of the year award, World Cup 
selection and European championship selection.  
 
Following OLS estimation, we run Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions to check for 
differences in returns to observable and unobserved characteristics, by nationality group. 
In this exercise, we divide the wage gap between Italians and non-Italians into a part that 
is explained by wage determinants (player Xs, productivity etc.) and a part that cannot be 
explained by these differences. We do this with and without productivity and also with 
and without team fixed effects.  
 
Wage premia for nationality characteristics may reflect compensating wage differentials. 
Specifically, Italian players may prefer to stay in Italy and accept lower pay to express 
this preference. There may be a further penalty among Italians for remaining close to 
their place of birth. To check this we create a proxy variable, local, to register cases of 
players who perform for teams close to their birthplace, and we put this in the wage 
regressions alongside the Italian dummy to distinguish local and non-local Italian players. 
Wage premia for migrants may vary through the salary distribution. For instance, if 
differences are associated with the superstar concentration among migrant workers we 
would expect a larger migrant differential at the top of the wage distribution.  We 
therefore run quantile regressions at the twenty-fifth, median, seventy-fifth and ninetieth 
percentiles.  We repeat the wage decomposition on quantiles of the wage distribution. 
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Finally, we collapse our data set into team level variables and run OLS models for club 
attendances and club points won to explore the effects of changes in the percentage 
migrant, changes in the quality of labour (as measured by predicted wages aggregated to 
club level) and wage residuals - which may be positive or negative and thus capture some 
of the "superstar" effects or discrimination effects discussed above.  The team attendance 
model is as follows: 
 
(2) Log team attendance  = g(predicted salary, residual salary, team points, year, 
 nationality, team fixed effects) 
where  predicted salary is mean predicted log salary for players at the club based on first 
stage regression of individual earnings as a function of  variables similar to those entering 
the model in (1) above. We run the model on Italians only and recover out-of-sample 
predictions for migrants' salaries and residuals.10 The models include labour productivity 
and productivity squared terms and club fixed effects. Residual salary is the residuals 
from the same earnings equation aggregated to club means. Predicted salary is then a 
proxy for explained quality of team rosters while residual salary represents an 
unexplained salary component of team playing quality. Points are scaled by the maximum 
possible in a given season and represent team attainment. We use the same two-stage 
methodology to isolate the association between changes in migrant share and changes in 
team points.  The team points model is identical to equation (2) except that team points 
becomes the left-hand side variable.  
                                                 
10 We also ran these first stage wage regressions for all workers with and without nationality dummies.  
Results are insensitive to the method used. 
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6. RESULTS 
When nationality is entered into a model alongside season dummies, domestic Italian 
players suffer a wage penalty of almost 40% relative to non-European migrants, and more 
than double that relative to European migrants (Table 1, row 1).  These wage penalties 
increase when accounting for personal characteristics such as age, footedness, playing 
position and number of seasons playing professional football in Italy (row 2).  The 
nationality effects change dramatically with the inclusion of individual player 
performance measures in row 3.  These measures soak up a considerable amount of the 
variance in footballers' wages such that the R-squared rises from 0.36 to 0.61 with their 
addition.  They also account for a substantial part of the wage penalty experienced by 
domestic Italian football players.  Nevertheless, a sizeable wage penalty remains with 
Italians earning roughly one-third less than "like" players with similar on-field 
productivity.11  It is also notable that, once labour productivity is introduced the gap 
between non-Italians becomes small and statistically non-significant, suggesting that 
most of the wage premium enjoyed by European migrants over non-European migrants is 
accounted for by their superior on-field performance.  Row 4 introduces the club's ability 
to pay captured in terms of the division it plays in, its success on the field (points), and 
crowd attendances.  These are important, increasing the model's R-squared to 0.74.  The 
club's ability to pay also accounts for some of the wage penalty suffered by Italian 
players.  Nevertheless, they are still paid around one-fifth less than "like" European 
                                                 
11 Some of the productivity we attribute to individuals may, in fact, be productivity spillovers from co-
workers. We partial some of this effect out in sensitivity analyses using the mean time to end of contract 
among the player’s co-workers. Like Berri and Krautmann (2006) we find player productivity rises as 
contract expiry approaches, so the average time to contract expiry among co-workers helps filter out some 
of this productivity spillover.  Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion of this variable. 
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migrants and 14% less than non-European migrants. (The wage difference between 
European and non-European migrants is statistically insignificant). The picture is similar 
if we replace clubs’ ability to pay with club fixed effects in row 5, thus indicating that the 
Italian domestic player wage penalty in Italian professional football is also apparent 
within clubs.12 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Having established that domestic workers suffer a sizeable wage penalty relative to 
migrants, and that differences between migrants are not statistically significant having 
conditioned on individual performance, we explore possible reasons for the wage penalty 
or “gap” between domestic and migrant workers. We begin with a decomposition of the 
wage “gap” into a part which can be “explained” by observable characteristics and a part 
that remains “unexplained” by these differences, as is standard in the gender wage gap 
literature, for example.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
An OLS log earnings equation with only a dummy variable identifying domestic workers 
reveals a wage penalty of 0.48 log points (61%). Model 1, which accounts for personal 
and team characteristics together with year dummies, accounts for just over two-fifths of 
this gap.  The replacement of club characteristics by club fixed effects makes little 
difference (Model 4). However, equivalent models which also account for time-varying 
individual on-field performance account for much more of the gap (Models 2 and 5).  The 
introduction of productivity squared terms increases the explained variance still further, 
by around 6-7 percentage points (Models 3 and 6). It is apparent, therefore, that a large 
                                                 
12 The EU migrant/non-EU migrant distinction captures the key distinction within the migrant group. 
Further investigations revealed no substantial, statistically significant differences between migrants from 
particular countries. 
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part of the gap in earnings between domestic and migrant football players is attributable 
to differences in labour productivity and that these productivity effects are non-linear. 
Migrant players have higher labour productivity, on average, which, once accounted for, 
reduces the otherwise unexplained gap between the earnings of Italians and their non-
Italian counterparts. Nevertheless, a sizeable unexplained wage gap of around one-quarter 
remains even after we account for club fixed effects and individual labour productivity.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
If superstardom plays a role in explaining the differences in mean earnings presented 
above one would expect the differences to be most pronounced among high earners. 
There is some evidence to support this proposition in Table 3 which uses quantile 
regression estimates. We can then compare the earnings differentials for EU migrants and 
non-EU migrants with those of domestic Italian workers at the 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles of the wage distribution.   
 
Panel A runs quantile regression estimates using the same model specification as that 
presented in Model 4 in Table 1.  It conditions on personal characteristics, season 
dummies, individual performance and club covariates.  The R-squared values indicate 
that the model does a good job in accounting for the variance in earnings across the wage 
distribution. There is no statistically significant difference in the earnings of migrant and 
domestic workers in the bottom quartile of the earnings distribution.  However, there is a 
substantial and statistically significant wage penalty for domestic workers in the top half 
of the earnings distribution, one that rises as we move up the distribution.  Among 
workers at the 90th percentile, non-EU migrants earn 23% more than "like" Italians, 
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while EU migrants earn 42% more than "like" Italians.  The fact that large earnings 
differentials exist at median earnings suggests that superstardom is not the sole factor 
explaining the wage penalty for domestic workers, but the size of the differentials at the 
top of the wage distribution does suggest that superstardom is one factor. 
 
Panel B replaces the club covariates with club fixed effects resulting in a modest 
improvement in model fit at all points in the wage distribution.  The results for these 
within-club estimates are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A, but they differ in two 
key respects. First, there is evidence of a statistically significant wage penalty for 
domestic workers relative to migrant workers in the lowest quartile of the wage 
distribution. Second, although the migrant-native wage differential is larger at the 90th 
percentile than it is at the 25th percentile, there is no monotonic increase in the size of the 
differential as we move up the earnings distribution.  
 
We decompose the quantile wage distribution to examine the size of the “unexplained” 
wage gap between migrants and natives at different parts of the wage distribution and the 
role played by labour productivity controls in closing the gap.13  We find the introduction 
of individual performance covariates substantially reduces the "unexplained" component 
throughout the wage distribution.  Thus the introduction of individual performance (the 
equivalent of moving from Model (4) to Model (5) in Table 2) results in the 
"unexplained" component falling from 32% to 12% at the 25th percentile and from 62% 
to 47% at the 90th percentile.  Second, the proportion of the migrant wage gap that is not 
                                                 
13 We use Blaise Melly's RQDECO programme in Stata (Melly, 2006) which is numerically equivalent to 
Machado and Mata's (2005) method where the number of simulations in Machado and Mata goes to 
infinity.  Full results are available on request. 
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accounted for by worker and club characteristics tends to rise as one goes up the wage 
distribution, irrespective of whether one conditions on labour productivity.  This is 
consistent with superstar effects arising from unobserved labour productivity differentials 
or a popularity premium.  
 [INSERT TABLE 4] 
If migrant superstars' wage premium reflects popularity, as Adler contends, one would 
expect an increase in the percentage of non-Italians to increase attendance at football 
matches, even having conditioned on team success.  To see if this is the case Table 4 runs 
panel club fixed effects models estimating log crowd attendance. In addition to a 
continuous time trend and team points the models control for the mean of the residuals 
from a first stage wage regression and the mean predicted salary for workers based on the 
same model.  Model (1) indicates that an increase in the proportion of club players who 
are Italian is associated with a decline in crowd attendance at that club's games.  The 
effect is robust to the inclusion of worker quality as captured by predicted salary, which 
is itself positive and statistically significant, and wage residuals (Models (2) and (3)). 
Models (4) to (6) show that it is an increase in the percentage of EU migrants that is 
behind increased attendance when the percentage Italian falls.14  An increase of one 
standard deviation in the percentage of EU migrants results in an increase of just under 
1% in crowd attendance.15 The findings are consistent with the proposition that migrants 
are able to command a wage premium through their popularity with fans, although the 
effect is confined to EU migrants.   
                                                 
14 The results are robust to the exclusion of clubs who appear fewer than three times in our panel. As might 
be expected, there is no significant difference between the share of Italian locals and non-locals on the 
team.  Results are available on request. 
15 Coefficient of 1.4 multiplied by standard deviation of 0.06 in the percentage EU migrants equals 0.084. 
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[INSERT TABLE 5] 
If migrant superstar wages reflect productivity, as Rosen might have contended, we 
would expect team success to vary with the proportion migrants in the team. Table 5 uses 
the same methodology as the attendance models to estimate panel club fixed effects 
models for team points, the best indicator of on-field team performance.  An increase in 
the proportion of Italians playing for the club reduces team points, a finding which is 
robust to the inclusion of predicted salaries and residuals (Models (2) and (3)). The 
positive effect of increasing the proportion of migrants on team points is apparent for 
both EU migrants and non-EU migrants.  An increase of one standard deviation in the 
proportion of Italians results in a reduction of 1% in a team's points ratio.16 The fact that 
increases in the share of non-EU migrants improve team performance but not crowd 
attendance might be explained by customers' discrimination on the grounds of skin 
colour.17  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally we return to individual-level wage equations to test the proposition that part of the 
wage penalty facing domestic workers compared with "like" migrants is related to 
Italians' preference for staying at home.  Italian locals do not seem to suffer a wage 
penalty relative to non-local Italians until one controls for club covariates, whereupon a 
13% wage penalty emerges.  The effect is robust to the replacement of club covariates 
with club dummies so that the effect persists having accounted for fixed unobservable 
                                                 
16 The elasticity is obtained by multiplying the Italian coefficient of 0.58 by 0.18 which is the standard 
deviation in the proportion of Italians. The effect is robust to the inclusion of other controls such as total 
payroll and a gini coefficient for wage inequality in the team. It is also robust to use of all teams, regardless 
of the number of times they appear in the panel, although the estimates for non-EU migrants are less 
precisely estimated and significant at a 90 percent confidence level. 
17 For other evidence on customer racial discrimination in sports viewing see Kanazawa and Funk (2001). 
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characteristics of the employer.  It would therefore appear that part of the wage penalty 
domestic workers face is due to their preference for staying at home which gives the 
employer some bargaining power which it does not have over other workers.  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Using panel data on players linked to teams in the top two divisions of Italian 
professional football  over a seven year period we find a substantial and robust wage 
premium for migrants which persists within teams and is only partially accounted for by 
individual labour productivity.  This is despite the fact that our set of productivity 
measures is much richer than those in most empirical studies of wages, including other 
European football salary studies published so far (Frick, 2011). 
 
We find evidence consistent with the premium reflecting migrant superstar status.  This 
superstar status is apparent in the growing wage premium for migrants as one goes up the 
earnings distribution.  The fact that changes in the proportion migrant are positively 
associated with team points, even controlling for club fixed effects and labour quality as 
measured by predicted wages and residuals, is consistent with the migrant share picking 
up superstar talent which helps teams perform better than if they were replaced by 
domestic players.  This is the sort of productivity-based superstardom which Rosen 
describes. However, the fact that crowd attendances rise and fall with the proportion 
migrant in the team, having controlled for team fixed effects, labour quality and team 
points, is suggestive of an effect akin to Adler's popularity-based superstardom. The 
20 
 
evidence therefore suggests that migrant footballers in Italy may possess both greater 
talent and greater popularity in keeping with both the Rosen and Adler definitions of 
superstardom. 
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 Table 1: OLS Log Wage Regressions 
Model Non-EU EU non-Italian R2 
(1) Nationality + year dummies 0.361 (3.58) 0.821 (5.28) 0.087 
(2) As (1) + player characteristics 0.656 (7.10) 0.973 (6.71) 0.357 
(3) As (2) + time-varying individual performance 0.318 (4.69) 0.344 (2.89) 0.614 
(4) As (3) + club time-varying variables 0.130 (2.63) 0.230 (2.51) 0.738 
(5) As (3) + club fixed effects 0.135 (2.82) 0.246 (3.12) 0.766 
(6) As (3) + performance squared 0.266 (4.13) 0.235 (2.00) 0.635 
(7) As (4) + performance squared 0.109 (2.26) 0.170 (1.87) 0.746 
(8) As (5) + performance squared 0.110 (2.37) 0.186 (2.36) 0.773 
Notes: 
(1) N=2,488, 906 players over 7 seasons. 34 club dummies for club fixed effects model. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. 
(3) All models contain 7 dummies for season. Player characteristics are: age, age squared, footedness (3 
dummies), position (4 dummies), total N seasons played in Italy. Player performance variables (all for 
season prior to wage measurement unless stated) are: total appearances in Serie A, total appearances in 
Serie B, minutes played in season, minutes played in season squared, total goals scored in Series A and B, 
total goals in current season, N 'assists' for a goal, N successful passes made, N times lost ball to 
opposition, N times recovered ball from opposition, N goalkeeper saves, N total shots, N shots on target, N 
tackles made, N times Italian Footballer of the Year in career, N World Cup appearances in career, N 
European Championship appearances in career. Club characteristics are: points in a season (expressed as a 
ratio relative to other clubs to account for variance in N clubs in the league), team in Serie A or B, lagged 
crowd attendance. 
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Table 2: Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition of Domestic-Migrant Wage Gap 
Model Explained Unexplained % unexplained 
(1) Player and club characteristics + years 0.204 (2.80) 0.273 (4.82) 57.2 
(2) As (1) + individual performance 0.326 (4.17) 0.151 (3.22) 31.7 
(3) As (2) + performance squared 0.355 (4.46) 0.121 (2.68) 25.4 
(4) Player characteristics + years + club fixed 
effects 
0.223 (2.92) 0.253 (4.66) 53.0 
(5) As (4) + individual performance 0.318 (3.97) 0.159 (3.66) 33.3 
(6) As (5) + performance squared 0.351 (4.29) 0.126 (2.99) 26.4 
Notes: 
(1) See Table 1 notes for sample and control variables.  
(2) t-statistics in parentheses. 
(3) Following Jann (2008) the decomposition is based on coefficients from a pooled model over both 
domestic and migrant workers and incorporates a dummy variable identifying domestic workers. 
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Table 3: Log wage quantile regressions 
Percentiles 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Panel A: model with club covariates 
Non-EU 0.016 (0.36) 0.095 (2.40) 0.182 (3.69) 0.204 (2.35) 
EU non-Italian 0.058 (0.77) 0.262 (4.22) 0.288 (4.68) 0.349 (3.52) 
R2 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.55 
Panel B: model with club fixed effects 
Non-EU 0.095 (2.19) 0.111 (2.83) 0.136 (3.20) 0.137 (1.86) 
EU non-Italian 0.215 (2.98) 0.286 (4.76) 0.221 (3.72) 0.286 (3.12) 
R2 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.59 
Notes: 
(1) See Table 1 notes for sample and control variables.  The club covariate models are identical to Model 7 
in Table 1 and the club fixed effects models are identical to Model 8 in Table 1.  
(2) t-statistics in parentheses, based on bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications. 
(3) The reference category for nationality is Italians. 
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Table 4: Log crowd attendance models 
 
(1) M1 (2) M2 (3) M3 (4) M4 (5) M5 (6) M6 
Italian -0.463 -0.449 -0.450 
   
 
-2.18 -1.97 -1.99 
   Points ratio 0.231 0.202 0.201 0.197 0.160 0.158 
 
1.43 1.47 1.46 1.33 1.30 1.28 
Year -0.071 -0.066 -0.065 -0.070 -0.064 -0.064 
 
-5.81 -5.44 -5.44 -5.79 -5.52 -5.54 
Predicted salary 
 
0.142 0.130 
 
0.156 0.144 
  
2.39 2.28 
 
2.79 2.70 
Residuals 
  
0.111 
  
0.117 
   
1.31 
  
1.40 
EU non-Italian 
   
1.233 1.354 1.367 
    
2.78 2.85 2.92 
Non-EU 
   
0.255 0.193 0.188 
    
1.03 0.75 0.71 
Constant 3.417 3.468 3.456 2.976 3.052 3.040 
 
14.60 14.69 14.78 19.16 26.56 26.15 
Adj R-sq 0.924 0.930 0.930 0.927 0.934 0.935 
 
Notes: 
(1) Club fixed effects models estimating log crowd attendance over the season. N=121 club-season 
observations based on 30 clubs in Models (1) and (2).  N drops to 23 clubs and 112 club-season 
observations in Models (3) and (4) when we confine analysis to clubs appearing at least 3 times in the 
panel. Four clubs drop out of this analysis due to missing data on attendance. 
(2) Predicted salary is mean predicted log salary for players at the club based on first stage regression of 
individual earnings as a function of  all variables entering Model (8) in Table 1 (personal, season dummies, 
time-varying labour productivity, productivity squared and team fixed effects). Residual is residuals from 
same earnings equation aggregated to club mean. 
(3) t-stats in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Points ratio models 
 
(1) M1 (2) M2 (3) M3 (4) M4 (5) M5 (6) M6 
Italian -0.581 -0.575 -0.575 
   
 
-3.13 -3.01 -3.00 
   Years -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 
-0.48 -0.28 -0.28 -0.42 -0.21 -0.21 
Predicted salary 
 
0.041 0.040 
 
0.044 0.044 
  
0.86 0.87 
 
0.93 0.94 
Residuals 
  
0.004 
  
0.005 
   
0.05 
  
0.07 
EU non-Italian 
   
0.912 0.937 0.938 
    
2.26 2.28 2.26 
Non-EU 
   
0.509 0.491 0.490 
    
2.33 2.15 2.15 
Constant 1.299 1.304 1.304 0.711 0.724 0.723 
 
9.58 9.17 9.17 10.28 11.04 10.56 
Adj. R-squared 0.664 0.663 0.659 0.666 0.666 0.662 
 
Notes: 
(1) Club fixed effects models estimating points ratio over the season. N=112 club-season observations 
based on 23 clubs appearing at least 3 times in the panel. Four clubs drop out of this analysis due to missing 
data on attendance. 
(2) Predicted salary is mean predicted log salary for players at the club based on first stage regression of 
individual earnings as a function of  all variables entering Model (8) in Table 1 (personal, season dummies, 
time-varying labour productivity, productivity squared and team fixed effects). Residual is residuals from 
same earnings equation aggregated to club mean. 
(3) t-stats in parentheses. 
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Table 6: OLS Log Wage Regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) Reference category for nationality is Italians playing at clubs at least 200 kilometres distant from where they were born. See Table 1 notes for sample sizes 
and remaining control variables. 
(2) t-statistics in parentheses
Model Italian locals Non-EU EU non-Italian R2 
(1) Nationality + year dummies -0.038 (0.25) 0.335 (3.52) 0.815 (5.24) 0.087 
(2) As (1) + player characteristics 0.059 (0.55) 0.666 (7.09) 0.984 (6.75) 0.357 
(3) As (2) + time-varying individual performance -0.071 (1.12) 0.304 (4.41) 0.329 (2.75) 0.615 
(4) As (3) + club time-varying variables -0.119 (2.77) 0.106 (2.13) 0.205 (2.22) 0.739 
(5) As (3) + club fixed effects -0.104 (2.38) 0.116 (2.38) 0.226 (2.83) 0.767 
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